This paper considers Kripke completeness of Nelson's constructive predicate logic N3 and its several variants. N3 is an extension of intuitionistic predicate logic Int by an contructive negation operator ∼ called strong negation. The variants of N3 in consideration are by omitting the axiom A → (∼A → B), by adding the axiom of constant domain ∀x(A(x) ∨ B) → ∀xA(x) ∨ B, by adding (A → B) ∨ (B → A), and by adding ¬¬(A ∨ ∼A); the last one we would like to call the axiom of potential omniscience and can be interpreted that we can eventually verify or falsify a statement, with proper additional information. The proofs of completeness are by the widely-applicable treesequent method; however, for those logics with the axiom of potential omniscience we can hardly go through with a simple application of it. For them we present two different proofs: one is by an embedding of classical logic, and the other by the TSg method, which is an extension of the tree-sequent method.
Introduction

Strong negation
Strong (or constructive) negation, denoted by ∼ in this paper, is a negation operator in constructive logics introduced by Nelson [16] , Markov [15] , and von Kutschera [29] . 1 In intuitionistic logic, the negation operator ¬A, which we would like to call Heyting's negation to make it distinct from the strong one, is an abbreviation for A → ⊥, i.e. A implies absurdity. This kind of treatment of negation is justified by such a viewpoint as Grzegorczyk's one, "the compound sentences are not a product of experiment, they arise from reasoning. This concerns also negation: we see that the lemon is yellow, we do not see that it is not blue" [8] .
However, such an example as Kracht cites yields an alternative definition of negation, especially for constructivists: "we can not only verify a simple proposition such as This door is locked. by direct inspection, but also falsify it" [13] . This motivates the idea of strong negation, that is, taking negative information as primitive as positive one.
The axiom of potential omniscience
Since N3 is a conservative extension of Int, it is natural to consider extensions of intermediate logics (which include Int and are included by classical logic Cl) by the strong negation operator. 2 However, the study of extra axioms which are peculiar to logics with strong negation seems to have been paid less attention to. We will consider one of such axioms in this paper: ¬¬(A ∨ ∼A), which we would like to call the axiom of potential omniscience. Intuitively it is interpreted that we can eventually verify or falsify any statement, with proper additional information. Now we shall see what can be implied by the axiom.
In the Kripke-type interpretation, the axiom of potential omniscience corresponds to the following statement: for every closed formula A and every state of information a, there is a state b which is reachable from a and where A is either verified or refuted. Hence the axiom, especially when combined with the axiom (A → B)∨(B → A) which can be interpreted that the set of information states is linearly ordered, seems useful to formalize such cases as some kind of games, e.g. cryptography; consider a game where one player (or a dealer, say Alice) knows the answer and the other player (say Bob) tries to find it. In such a game Bob can reach the correct answer if he obtains the information that Alice has.
The axiom may also be considered as one of the weaker versions of the law of excluded middle, A ∨ ∼A. 
What is shown in this paper
This paper is to show Kripke completeness of several variants of Nelson's constructive logic N3, for the quantified case. The proofs are by the usage of a tree-sequent, which is a labelled tree each node of which is associated with a sequent. The treesequent method can be regarded as a kind of semantic tableaux, and since it aims at completeness as to Kripke-models of a tree-shape, a tree-sequent has its shape. Needless to say the method is also applicable to Kripke completeness of Int and some intermediate predicate logics; the results can be found in [12] .
The logics whose Kripke completeness is proved in this paper are presented in Fig.  1 , enclosed in a box. 4 For those four logics which are not enclosed, we shall see the difficulty therein in the last section.
Here the basic logics are N3 and N4: N4 is obtained from N3 by omitting the axiom A → (∼A → B), which is one of those which axiomatize ∼ and may be considered as the constructive version of the ex falso rule ⊥ → B. In Kripke-type semantics for N3 the verum interpretation I + and the falsum one I − are always disjoint, hence for each formula A and each possible world a we have one of the following three: A is verified at a, A is falsified at a, or A is neither verified nor falsified at a. For N4 where I + and I − may intersect, we have another possibility: A is both verified and falsified at a. Hence the name of the logics; N4 is for four-valued. N4 is known to be is characterized by the class of Kripke models whose domain is a constant map, as Görnemann [7] shows. d is for Domain.
l Adding the axiom (A → B) ∨ (B → A). Dummett's logic LC, which is Int plus this axiom, is characterized by the class of linearly ordered Kripke models, as Corsi [3] shows. 6 l is for Linear.
o Adding the axiom of potential omniscience, ¬¬(A ∨ ∼A). o is for Omniscience.
The family of sixteen logics presented in the lattices above we would like to call the N-family in this paper. While the completeness proofs for those without o are easy by simple applications of the tree-sequent method, the proofs for those with o are not, since the axiom of potential omniscience refers to, so to speak, upper-bounds of a Kripke model. For them we present two different proofs. One proof is applicable only to N3o and N3lo; it is by an embedding of Cl into N3o, and omniscient possible worlds (where every formula is either verified or falsified) are induced by Cl-models (or structures). The other is by an extension of the tree-sequent method which we would like to call the tree-sequent with guardians (abbreviated TSg) method.
There are some logics in the N-family whose Kripke completeness is already shown: N3 is by Gurevich [9] and by van Dalen [28] , N3d is by Thomason [25] , and N4 is by Odintsov and Wansing [18] . Nevertheless the authors do not take their own tree-sequent-based proofs as useless; the method used in them is applicable to other logics. 5 Priest and Routley [21] give an introduction to paraconsistent logics. See also Odintsov [17] , Odintsov and
Wansing [18] 6 Kripke completeness of CD or LC can be proved more easily using the tree-sequent method. The proof is just the same as that for N3d or N3l, and presented in [12] .
Notations
In this paper we adopt Gentzen-style sequent systems for the formal presentation of logics; 7 a sequent system for logic L is denoted by GL. And later we will introduce tree-sequent systems and TSg systems for the proofs of Kripke completeness; the tree-sequent system for logic L is denoted by TL, and the TSg system is by TgL.
We often denote logics by such a form as N We do not consider constants or function symbols, which makes the argument simpler without essential loss of generality.
Syntactical equivalence is denoted by ≡. For example, A∧B and B ∧A are logically equivalent in those logics considered in this paper; however, A ∧ B ≡ B ∧ A.
A[y/x] is a substitution, obtained by replacing every free occurrences of x in A by y. It is not preferable that by substitution new bound variables come to existence; we avoid such cases by taking variants, i.e. replacing bound variables.
As in Tarski-type semantics for classical logic Cl, in defining |= and its variants we will introduce temporary constants each of which designates a certain individual u. This kind of constant is said to be the name of u and denoted by u.
For a finite set of formulas Γ = {A 1 , . . . , A m }, Γ (or Γ) is an abbreviation for
, which is an abbreviation for A → A (or ¬(A → A), respectively).
Syntax and semantics
Gentzen-style sequent systems GN
Here we introduce Gentzen-style sequent systems for logics in the N-family. They share one formal language, consisting of the following symbols: countably many variables, x 1 , x 2 , . . . ; countably many m-ary predicate symbols for each m ∈ N, p A ↔ B is an abbreviation of (A → B) ∧ (B → A). Terms and formulas are composed in the same way as those of Cl, and note that ∼ is unary. The binding strength of the connectives are: ∀, ¬, ∼ ≥ ∧ ≥ →. A sequent is defined as an ordered pair of finite sets of formulas separated by the symbol ⇒, hence the rule of exchange or contraction can be omitted. Now we present the initial sequents and derivation rules of a Gentzen-style sequent system GN3 for the logic N3:
Here the subscript S indicates the condition of no side formulas, that is, the succedent of the lower sequent must consist of only one formula, and VC the eigenvariable condition, i.e. the eigenvariable z must not have free occurrences in the lower sequent.
The initial sequents and derivation rules which do not involve ∼ precisely coincides with those of Maehara's LJ ′ , which is equivalent to LJ and one of sequent systems for Int.
If a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is derived using the initial sequents and rules above,
For variants of N3, 8 we can obtain sequent systems by the following modifications:
N4 Omit the initial sequents (Fal).
d Allow side formulas in the rule (∀R), resulting in the new rule
This is equivalent to adding ⇒ ∀x(A(x) ∨ B) → ∀xA(x) ∨ B as initial sequents, as is well-known about the intermediate logic CD.
l Add the initial sequents
o Add the initial sequents
There are a couple of equivalent additional rules; we shall see them later.
8 When we speak of variants of N3 they include
Kripke-type possible world semantics
Kripke-type semantics for logics in the N-family are extensions of that for Int, as stated in the previous section. First we shall describe the precise definitions, and then proceed to explain how the definitions are justified by our intuition. Let (M, ≤) be a poset, W a non-empty set, and U be a map of M into PW , satisfying:
For every predicate symbol p (we assume p is m-ary), we define two interpretations of p at a ∈ M , denoted by p I + (a) and p I − (a) , as subsets of U (a) m , satisfying:
Then the quintuple M = (M, ≤, U, I + , I − ) is said to be an N3-model. Given an N3-model M, we extend two interpretations I + and I − into two relations between an element in M and a closed formula, a |= + A and a |= − A, inductively on the construction of a closed formula A:
We write a |=
is valid (or valid in M, respectively). Now we describe how the definitions above can be understood. The elements of M can be considered as "points in time (or 'evidential situations'), at which we may have various pieces of information" [14] , and are often called possible worlds. Then the relation a ≤ b can be interpreted that a possible world a can develop into b.
U (a) is the domain of individuals at a, more precisely, individuals whose existence is recognized at a. p I + (a) (or p I − (a) ) designates atomic formulas which are verified (or falsified) at a, by direct inspections. If a ≤ b, then it is natural to assume that b inherits all the information available at a, hence
A is interpreted that a verifies, falsifies or neither verifies nor falsifies A. While whether Heyting's negation holds is reduced (through reasoning) to verum interpretation I + , strong negation is reduced to falsum interpretation I − , which is primitive and independent of I + . We can see the constructive character of N3-models in I − and |= − , comparing with Int-models. Note that (M, ≤) need not be linearly-ordered; a may develop into different possible worlds.
Kripke-type semantics for the logics other than N3 is obtained by the following modifications:
d Add the condition that the domain U : M → PW is a constant map.
l Add the condition that (M, ≤) is linearly ordered, that is, for every a, b ∈ M either a ≤ b or b ≤ a holds. o Add the condition that for every a ∈ M and every closed formula A, there exists b ≥ a where either b |=
In fact completeness shown later is often for smaller class of models; first, we can assume a set of possible worlds (M, ≤) to be a tree, since every model M can be transformed into an equivalent tree-shape model M t by taking each path of M as a node of M t . Second, the additional condition for o shall be strengthened as follows: for every a ∈ M , there exists a g ≥ a (we will often call a g the guardian of a) which is omniscient, that is, for every predicate symbol p (which is m-ary), p
Moreover, such a g shall be restricted to be a node which is an immediate successor of a and maximal in (M, ≤) for N3o and N3do, or restricted to be the maximum of (M, ≤) for N3lo and N3dlo.
Several examples of models for logics in the N-family are presented in Fig. 2 , where a circle is a possible world, an arrow from a to b denotes that a ≤ b, the upper colored part of a circle designates the closed formulas verified there, and the lower one those fasified.
The following lemmas which are true to our intuition are easily obtained by induction.
[o]-model and a ∈ M . Then it is impossible that both a |= + A and a |= − A hold.
Soundness of the sequent systems introduced in the previous section is again easily obtained by induction on the derivation. 3 Kripke completeness of GN
In this section we present proofs of Kripke completeness of eight logics,
, which are by the usage of the tree-sequent method. In fact, the proofs are just the same as that for Int, CD or LC. In what follows, the word tree-sequent is often abbreviated as TS.
First we introduce the TS systems TN 1. Let 0 be the root of T , and a 0 (= 0), a 1 , . . . , a n be an arbitrary path in T , and
is said to be the set of available variables at the node a n . 2. Every variable which has free occurrences in the sequent associated to a is available at a.
In other words, for (a : Γ a αa ⇒ ∆ a ) α a is the set of variables which are available at a for the first time in tracing from the root. [d] which is linearly ordered, i.e. each node of which has at most one successor.
As seen in the following proof of compleness, the set of available variables works as a seed of the domain at the node; hence the concept is unnecessary for the case of constant domain models, i.e. logics with d.
Here is an example of a TS of TN
where the sets of available variables at the node a, b, c and d are {x}, {x}, {x, y} and {x, y, z}, respectively. In what follows, we adopt the notation below of a TS, for economy of space:
However, this notation hardly clarifies the structure of a TS; it will be helpful for to rewrite it in the tree-style.
Since a TS of TN 3 4 [d]l is a linearly ordered finite tree, which is nothing but a finite sequence, we often omit [ and ] in its notation. Hence it is denoted in the form
Definition 3.5 (Tree-sequent system TN) Initial tree-sequents and derivation rules of TN are presented below, followed by some remarks which describe what they designate.
In the above, a tree-structure and undisplayed nodes are arbitrary; (Id) can be read as every TS which has a node of the form A α ⇒ A is an initial TS. In the derivation rules, tree-structures and undisplayed nodes are the same between the conclusion and the hypothesis (or hypotheses); (W) is adding formulas to one node of the upper TS.
The rules which are unique to TS's, namely the structural rule Drop (D) and the logical rules with the subscript T, are displayed in the tree-style:
In (D), a formula A in the antecedent of a node is dropped to that of its immedeate successor. In (∀R) T a leaf (i.e. a maximal node)
Note that the formula ∀xA must obtain its occurrence in the immediate successor of the trimmed leaf, and that the variable z has no free occurrence in Γ α ⇒ ∆ since z is available for the first time at
The former remark is also true of the rules (¬R) T and (→R) T .
In the rule (∼∀L) VC , VC is for the condition that the eigenvariable z have no free occurrences in any node of the upper TS.
It is seen that except (D) and those rules with the subscript T (which correspond to the rules of GN with the subscript S), the rules are of the form that the corresponding rules of GN are applied to one node of the upper TS (or TS's). TN 
l Those rules with subscript T are replaced. (∀R) T is replaced by
The subscript K is for sKip. Note that the eigenvariable z has no free occurrences in the lower TS, because of the shape of T k and the definition of a TS. (→R) T and (¬R) T are also replaced by (→R) K and (¬R) K respectively, which are of the same form as (∀R) K . For example in (→R) K ,
In TN 
Proof of Kripke completeness
The proofs of Kripke completeness of GN If T has no counter models, then T is said to be unrefutable.
It is easily seen that every TS derived in TN An infinite tree-sequent is a TS whose tree-structure, associating sequents, and associating sets of variables are all possibly infinite, satisfying the condition on availability of variables. TN 3 cept of saturated sequent with respect to a certain sequent system is often introduced for completeness proofs; see e.g. [12] . An infinite tree-sequent T of TN Let B 1 , B 2 , . . . be an enumeration of all the formulas of N3. We rearrange the sequence and obtain another sequence
which we denote by A 1 , A 2 , . . . . In A 1 , A 2 , . . . every formula of N3 appears infinitely many times. Since every term of N3 is nothing but a variable we can enumerate them as x 1 , x 2 , . . . . First we consider the case of TN3. The modifications of the proof for its variants we shall describe later.
Let T 0 :≡ T . The i-th step, which is the step of extension from T i−1 to T i , consists of inheritance and reduction of the formula A i , using a finite number of variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i (hence the step involves only a finite number of operations). Note that in each operation unprovability of the TS is preserved. The operations executed in the i-th step are as follows:
1.
[inheritance] For each node (a : Γ a αa ⇒ ∆ a ) such that A i ∈ Γ a , add A i to the antecedents of all the successors of a. Unprovability is preserved because of the rule (D) of TN3. 2.
[reduction] According to the shape of A i , one of the following operations is executed for each node (a :
, then add B and C to Γ a . Unprovability is preserved because of the rule (∧L) of TN3. If A i ∈ ∆ a , then add either B or C to ∆ a , so that unprovability is preserved. This is possible because of the rule (∧R); if neither choice preserves unprovability, then by the rule the original TS must be provable, which is a contradiction. Each operation below also preserves unprovability because of the corresponding rule of TN3, although we do not put explicitly. . . .
to Γ a , for each x j ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x i } which is available at a. If A i ∈ ∆ a , then take a fresh variable x m and make a new leaf
as an immediate successor of a; we can take fresh x m since the original TS is finite.
then take a fresh variable x m , add ∼B[x m /x] to Γ a , and also add x m to α a . If A i ∈ ∆ a , add ∼B[x j /x] to ∆ a , for each x j ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x i } which is available at a.
For variants of N3, the following modifications are to be made: ] to Γ a , for each x j ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x i } which is available at a. Assume A i ∈ ∆ a . Let the TS to which the operation is about to be applied denoted by
Now take a fresh variable x m and let the TS's S 1 , . . . , S k be
Take an unprovable S l as a new TS; this is possible because of the rule (∀R) K . The modified (2b) and (2c) are just the same as above, inserting a new node in such a position that unprovability is preserved.
Let T ω be the union of T 0 , T 1 , . . . , i.e. the tree-structure, associating sequents and associating sets of variables of T ω are the unions of those of T 0 , T 1 , . . . . It is easily verified that T ω is TN + , I − ) using syntactical objects, namely the TN3-saturated T ω obtained above. Let (M, ≤) be the tree-structure of T ω , U (a) be the set of available variables at a. For each node (a : Γ a αa ⇒ ∆ a ) of T ω and each predicate symbol p (which is m-ary), the verum / falsum interpretation of p at a is defined by:
It is easily verified that M satisfies the conditions for N3-model. Indeed, the condition on T that some variables are available at its root yields that U (a) = ∅ for every a ∈ M . If a ≤ b and (y 1 , . . . , y m ) ∈ p Since T is a sub-tree-sequent of T ω , we can take the identity map as an embedding of the tree-structure of T in (M, ≤), and also can take the set of all variables as W , where U : M → PW . Then it is again easily verified by induction on the construction of formulas that M is a counter model for T . 
. The formulaic translation of T , again denoted by T f , is a universal closure of T p , which in turn is defined inductively on the height of T :
To prove this lemma we prove a couple of sublemmas, whose proofs are easy by induction on the height of a in T .
Sublemma 3.12
Let T be a TS of TN 
Sublemma 3.13
Let T and T ′ be just as in the sublemma above. If GN
Proof. (of Lemma 3.11) The case for N 3 4 is easy. The proof is by induction on the derivation of T in TN 3 4 . When T is an initial TS, use the second sublemma. For the step cases where T is derived by a derivation rule with a hypothesis (or hypotheses), use the first sublemma.
For those logics with l the proofs are just the same; however, the step case where T is derived by the rule (→R) K , (¬R) K or (∀R) K is rather complicated. Here we present the case for (→R) K . It suffices to prove that
GN4l (hence GN
The above two sequents are derivable in GN
For those logics with d, the proof is again almost the same; however, we cannot apply the first sublemma when T is derived by the rule (∀R) VC . Instead we use the character of logics with D, that is:
, where x has no free occurrences in B and ∼ = denotes logical equivalence. Suppose GN
f is in the form
where z has no free occurrence in any B i or C i . We repeatedly apply the logical equivalences above and obtain
Then the induction hypothesis yields GN
Using Kripke completeness of TN + , I − ) we shall construct is such that: each a ∈ M which is not omniscient has an immediate successor a g which is maximal in (M, ≤) and is omniscient.
; hence by completeness in the previous section there exists a counter
The problem is how to obtain an omniscient possible world a g which will be associated to each node a of M ′ . The first proof, presented in this subsection, utilizes an embedding of Cl in GN3[l]o for this purpose. As we point out later, this method is not applicable to
First we present some derivations possible in GN
, we can make the following derivations:
In fact (Om) is equivalent to (Om3): take B ≡ A in (Om3), and use (C) with
and (Om) are all equivalent. Since the proof above shows that (Om)⇒(Om1)⇒(Om2), it suffices to show (Om2)⇒(Om):
Now we make some remarks. All of ∨, → and ∃ can be introduced as defined symbols in Cl in terms of ∧, ¬ and ∀; however in this paper we assume the logical connectives of Cl include →, to make correspondence with
In what follows a structure in Tarski-type semantics for Cl is often called a Cl-model. Cl-model can be regarded as an Int-model consisting of only one possible world. We denote the domain of a Cl-model A by |A|, and the interpretation of a predicate symbol p by p A . We will often denote a formula of Cl by A ¬ in order to make clear that A contains no ∼'s. A ∼¬ is a formula of N3 which is obtained by replacing some (possibly all or no) ¬'s in A by ∼. The subscript ∼¬ is also often used to make clear that it is a formula of N3. Then A ¬ is a formula obtained from A ∼¬ by replacing every ∼ therein by ¬.
Lemma 4.2
Let A be a Cl-model, and M A = (M, ≤, U, I
Proof. It is easily verified by induction that, for an omniscient possible world a (i.e. p
which is maximal in (M, ≤) and a closed formula A of N3, exactly one of a |= + A or a |= − A holds; hence the first iff instantly yields the second one.
The first iff is shown by induction on the construction of A; we present just one step case. Assume A ¬ ≡ ¬B ¬ . Then A ∼¬ ≡ ¬B ∼¬ or ∼B ∼¬ . A |= A ¬ iff A |= B ¬ , which is equivalent to 0 |= + B ∼¬ by the induction hypothesis. This is equivalent to 0 |= + ¬B ∼¬ since 0 has no successors, and is also equivalent to 0 |= + ∼B ∼¬ by the above argument.
Using the lemmas above, we can introduce the main lemma in this subsection:
The following are all equivalent: 
The cut rule (C) is necessary in the proof of the following lemma. If it is the case (we do not know whether or not) that (C) can be eliminated in
Lemma 4.7 Let T be a tree-sequent of
Proof. By induction on derivation in GN3[l]o. For initial sequents (Li) of GN3lo,
where
Every T i,j is provable in TN3lo by (Id), (W) and (D).
It is easy to check the cases for the other initial sequents or the rules which admit side formulas in its conclusion, i.e. other than ( ) S . For the rule (C) of
We present only the case for (→R) S ; for (¬R) S and (∀R) S, VC proofs are just the same.
In GN3lo, the proof is similar; first drop Γ, then apply (→R) K .
We define the formulaic translation of a TS T of
Proof. Similar to that of Lemma 3.11. ⇒ ∆ a ) of T ω which induces it, then add an omniscient world a g obtained as above (i.e. by the fact that (Γ a ) ¬ ⇒ is consistent in LK) as an immediate successor of a (see Fig. 4 .1).
For GN3lo, the proof is just the same. First extend the TS T :≡ [
is also. Corollary 4.4 yields that (Γ ω ) ¬ ⇒ is consistent in LK, and induces an omniscient world g in the same way as above. By adding g to M ′ as the maximum, we obtain a counter N3lo-model M for A. It remains to be proved that M is certainly an N3[l]o-model, and M |= A. In the following only the case for GN3o is in consideration; for GN3lo the proof is just the same.
Since U (a) is the set of the available variables and U (a g ) is {x 1 
is the corresponding node of T ω ; hence p( x) is in (Γ a ) ¬ (or not in (Γ a ) ¬ , respectively). By the construction of a g , i.e. by Lemma 4.2, x ∈ p I + (ag ) (or x ∈ p I − (ag ) ). It is easy to verify that M satisfies the other conditions of N3o-models.
In order to show M |= A, it suffices to show that: for each node (a :
, respectively) holds also in M (it holds in M ′ by definition). The proof is easy by induction; the point is that the addition of a g does not affect such conditions as that for a |= + ¬B, that is, "there exists at least one world b ≥ a such that b |= + B".
Remark 4.10
The method above is not applicable to GN3d[l]o. The problem lies in the proof of Lemma 4.5; we cannot construct a counter Cl-model without infinitely many additional variables.
Proof by TSg method -for GN3[d][l]o
The method in the previous subsection is not applicable to GN3d[l]o; that is because in the method we must construct omniscient possible worlds after we have finished extending an unprovable formula into an infinite TS. To avoid this problem, it seems reasonable to consider a method in which we extend both the TS and the seeds of omniscient possible worlds simultaneously; this is the idea of the proofs in this subsection.
In the proofs here we make usage of a tree-sequent with guardians, TSg in short. Roughly speaking, a TSg is a TS each node of which has an extra sequent and a finite set of variables; we denote a node a which is associated with Γ a αa ⇒ ∆ a and an extra
⇒ Π a (presented in the right) is said to be the guardian of a, and is the seed of an omniscient world a g which will be assigned to a. The TS-translation of a TSg, which we shall define later, will make clear the idea of TSg.
Using TSg's, we can prove Kripke completeness in the same way as that of GN Then G t is a tree-sequent of TN3; that is, G t satisfies the conditions as to availability of variables.
We shall call Γ a αa ⇒ ∆ a the sequent (or left sequent ) of a, and Σ a βa ⇒ Π a the guardian (or guardian sequent ). The TS G t is called the TS-translation of a TSg G. A variable x is said to be l-available at a node a of G if it is available at a in G t . x is g-available at a if it is available at a g in G t . For variants, the definition is modified as follows:
d A TSg is just a labelled tree each node of which is associated with two sequents.
l A TSg G and its TS-translation G t are simpler:
for TgN3lo. For TgN3dlo, omit the sets of variables. Here Σ β ⇒ Π is the only guardian of G, and denoted by g. In what follows we denote a TSg in the same way as we do a TS, using [, ] and |.
Definition 4.12 (TSg system TgN3[d][l]o)
Initial TSg's and derivation rules of TgN3o are presented below, ahead of those for its variants, followed by some remarks:
TgN3o has all the derivation rules of TN3, which are applied only to left sequents: 
For (g→R), the proof is similar to above, using (⋆). For (g∀R), it suffices to show that 
For (S), it suffices to show that
where y have no free occurrences in C, D or A. This is easy. 
Remarks on logics with N4[d][l]o
As stated in the introduction, Kripke completeness of logics N4 [d] [l]o is remain unproved in this paper. Here we are to show that their proofs cannot be done using our methods.
The key is an axiom ∀x¬¬A → ¬¬∀xA, called the double negation shift, DNS in
